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I. INTRODUCTION
The previous survey of Florida law on trusts and estates discussed
statutes, cases, and rules through the middle of 1998.1 This survey attempts
to update the prior survey through the middle of 2001.
This article highlights and summarizes, in Part II, some aspects of the
elective share provisions and other legislative changes to the Florida
Probate Code and trust administration statutes.2 Part III addresses amend-
ments to the Florida Probate Rules. Lastly, Part IV discusses a few recent
cases affecting this area of the law.
* Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod is an Associate Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern
University Shepard Broad Law Center. She is also Vice-Chair of the The Florida Bar Real
Property, Probate, and Trust Law Section Model and Uniform Acts Committee. The author
would like to express her gratitude to Olympia Duhart for her research assistance.
1. Michael D. Simon & William T. Hennessey, Estates, Trusts and Guardianships:
1998 Survey of Florida Law, 23 NOVA. L. REv. 119, 120 (1998). The 1998 survey also
included a discussion of guardianship law. See generally id. However, this survey will be
limited to the laws affecting probate estates and trusts and will not include references to
statutes or rules governing guardianships.
2. It is impractical to discuss all the changes to the probate estate and trust
administration statutes or other related statutes. Therefore, I will focus on what I deem the
more important or more interesting changes.
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II. STATUTORY CHANGES
The Florida Legislature has been quite active in the past three years in
amending the Florida Probate Code ("Probate Code"). Many of the
changes have been minor in nature, enacted for clarification purposes, 3 to
eliminate redundancies with the Florida Probate Rules ("Probate Rules"),4
or to correlate a statute with another statute, such as the renumbering of
statutes.5 However, the legislature did overhaul the elective share provisions
of the Florida Probate Code, bringing it somewhat more in line with the
Uniform Probate Code.6
A. Elective Share Provisions
The new elective share provisions took effect October 1, 1999.
7
However, they only apply to estates of decedents dying after October 1,
2001. 8 Most of the existing elective share provisions were repealed, rather
than merely amended, and new statutes were added in their place.
9
The spousal right to an elective share t° under section 732.201 has not
changed, but the statute was amended to reflect the right to a thirty percent"
share in the newly augmented "elective" estate.' 2 A spouse's right to this
3. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 732.302 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 733.805(1)(a) (2001)
(changing language in abatement rule from a "[p]roperty not disposed of by will" to a
"[p]roperty passing by intestacy").
4. See, e.g., FLA. Stat. § 731.301 (2001).
5. See, e.g., Ch. 2001-226, §§ 60-61, 2001 Fla. Laws 2010 (renumbering FLA. STAT.
§ 732,910-.911 (2001) as FLA. STAT. § 765.510-.511 (2001)).
6. See, e.g., UNWF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203 (amended 1993) (outlining augmented
estate).
7. § 732.2155(1) (2000).
8. Id.
9. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.201-.2155 (2001).
10. Of course, a spouse may have waived rights to an elective share pursuant to a
prenuptial or post nuptial agreement. For the requirements of a valid waiver effective January
2, 2001, see infra Part II.B. Any valid waiver executed prior to October 1, 1999, is valid
under the new provisions.
11. § 732.2065. An ad-hoc committee of the Florida bar had recommended
increasing the percentage of the estate payable to the surviving spouse based on the length of
the marriage but the legislature ultimately decided against that. See Florida's Elective Share
Revised Executive Summary 2, (revised Sept. 24, 2001), available at http://www.dpowell.com
[hereinafter Executive Summary].
12. § 732.201. The statute previously stated that "[the] surviving spouse... [has] the
right to a share of the estate of the [decedent]." FLA. STAT. § 732.201 (1999). The statute, as
[Vol. 26:37
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elective share is still in addition to the spouse's rights to other statutory
entitlements under Part IV of the Florida Probate Code,13 but the legislature
clarified that the homestead rights were included as well.
14
Previously, only a spouse or guardian of the surviving spouse's property
could exercise the right to the elective share. 15 The new statute also permits
a surviving spouse's attorney-in-fact to exercise the right to elect against the
estate.16 As always, if someone other than the surviving spouse exercises the
fight, then court approval is required; 17 however, the court must now take
into account the surviving spouse's lifetime needs when reviewing whether
the election is in the spouse's best interest.'8
In addition, the time period within which to make the election has been
extended "from four months from the date of the first publication of [the]
notice of administration"' 9 to the earlier of six months from the date the
surviving spouse or "an attorney in fact or guardian of the property of the
surviving spouse" are served with a copy of the notice of administration, 20 or
21two years after the decedent's death. Conceivably, a surviving spouse may
not discover that the decedent has died until* some time after the second
anniversary of the decedent's death and thus, under the new statute, the
surviving spouse may be precluded from electing against the estate. The
amended, now reads, "[the] surviving spouse... has the right to a share of the elective estate
of the decedent." § 732.201.
13. § 732.2105.
14. Ch. 99-343, § 10, 1999 Fla. Laws 3568 (renumbered from FLA. STAT. § 732.208
(1999) and amended at FLA. STAT. § 732.2105 (2000)). Section 732.2105 also states that a
spouse who takes against the estate is treated as having predeceased the decedent; this
provision was previously codified under section 732.211, which has since been repealed (Ch.
99-343, § 16, 1999 Fla. Laws 3571).
15. FA. STAT. § 732.210 (1999).
16. FLA. STAT. § 732.2125 (2001). The change finally codifies the court's holding in
In re Estate of Schriver, wherein the court stated that a holder of a durable power of attorney
could exercise the elective share right on behalf of a surviving spouse. 441 So. 2d 1105, 1108
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983) approved in part by Harmon v. Williams, 615 So. 2d 681 (Fla.
1993).
17. FLA. STAT. § 732.2125(2). If a surviving spouse's attorney-in-fact or guardian of
the property petitions the court for approval of the right to take the elective share, such
petition tolls the time for exercising the election. § 732.2135(4).
18. § 732.2125(2).
19. § 732.212.
20. FLA. STAT. § 732.2135(1) (2001). As originally enacted in 1999, it was the earlier
of six months from the first date of publication, rather than service of a copy, of notice of
administration. See id. It was recently amended to its present language.
21. Id.
2001]
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statute, though, provides that a court may grant an extension for good
22
cause.
Nevertheless, this mechanism does not solve the problem, as the
petition for an extension of time must be made within the time period
provided for making the election itself.23 In the above hypothetical then, it
seems that the spouse, within two years after the other spouse is missing,
would have to file for an extension of time in order to preserve the surviving
spouse's right to later elect against the estate. But then the question remains
as to whether a court would consider this to be good cause for granting any
extension. Is this really what the legislature intended?
After a petition for the elective share has been filed, the petition may be
withdrawn as long as it is done so within eight months after the decedent's
death and the court has not yet ordered contribution. However, upon
withdrawal, the court, in its discretion, may assess attorneys' fees and costs
against the surviving spouse.25
The biggest change to the elective share provisions concerns the
property that is included in computing the elective share amount. First, the
new elective share provisions no longer exclude real property located outside
of Florida from the probate assets included in the computation of the elective
26share. Section 732.2035 of the Florida Statutes includes all of the
decedent's "probate estate."27 The "probate estate" is defined within the
Probate Code as "all property wherever located that is subject to estate
administration in any state of the United States or in the District of
Columbia. ''28 The Probate Code clarifies that the decedent's "protected
homestead" is not included as an asset subject to administration, and thus, its
value is excluded from the elective share computation.
29
22. § 732.2135(2). A petition for an extension of time tolls the time for exercising the
election against the estate. § 732.2135(4).
23. § 732.2135(2).
24. § 732.2135(3).
25. Id. The surviving spouse's estate may also be assessed for such fees and costs
should the surviving spouse die. Id.
26. § 732.2035(1).
27. Id.
28. § 732.2025(7).
29. FLA. STAT. § 732.2045(1)(i). The legislature recently added a provision to the
Probate Code defining "protected homestead" as the property described under article X,
section 4 of the Florida Constitution, except for property held as a tenancy by entireties. FLA.
STAT. § 731.201(29).
[Vol. 26:37
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The decedent's interest in jointly held property is also included in the
elective estate.30 This includes accounts or securities held by the decedent at
the time of death in "pay on death," Totten trust, or other similar right of
survivorship form, or as a tenancy by the entireties.3 ' For tenancies by the
entireties, one-half of the value of the account or security is included in the
computation.32 For all other jointly held survivorship accounts or securities,
the amount included is the amount that could be withdrawn by the 'decedent
without accounting to the others.33
Likewise, the elective estate includes other property held by the
decedent at the time of death as a joint tenant with right of survivorship or as
a tenancy by the entireties.34 As with jointly held accounts and securities,35
one-half of such other property held as a tenancy by the entireties will be
included.36 Other property held as a tenancy with right of survivorship will
be valued based on the decedent's "fractional interest. ' 37 Thus, if a decedent
owned real property with three others as a tenancy with right of survivorship,
one-third of the value of the property is included in the elective estate.
When a transferred interest in property is revocable, the value of the
property at the time of the decedent's death is added into the computation of
the elective estate;38 revocable trusts fall into this category. However, only
those transfers that are revocable by the decedent individually or with
another person are taken into account;3 9 those transfers that are revocable
only upon the consent of all beneficiaries are excludedW
Irrevocable property transfers made by the decedent are also computed
into the elective estate.4 1 The Probate Code addresses two categories of
these irrevocable transfers. The first category consists of transfers by the
decedent in which the decedent retained the right to, or actually enjoyed the
possession or use of, income or principal at the time of the decedent's
death.42 The second category are those transfers by the decedent in which, at
30. § 732.2035(2), (3).
31. § 732.2035(2).
32. ld
33. Id.
34. § 732.2035(3).
35. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
36. § 732.2035(4).
37. § 732.2035(3).
38. Id.
39. § 732.2035(4).
40. Id.
41. § 732.2035(5).
42. § 732.2035(5)(a)(1).
2001]
Nova Law Review
the time of decedent's death, another person had discretionary powers to
distribute principal to the decedent,43 such as in an irrevocable discretionary
trust.
However, if the spouse possessed the discretionary power to distribute
the principal to the decedent, then the transfer is excluded, 44 as the spouse
presumptively would have consented to any such distribution to the
decedent. Both of these types of irrevocable transfers are valued, for
elective estate purposes, based on the interest that benefits any person other
than the decedent's estate.45 Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are some
exclusionary rules applicable to these irrevocable transfers. Excluded are
those distributions to the decedent permitted only upon the consent of all
beneficiaries, 47 as are those distributions made possible only through an
48exercisable general power of appointment. In addition, those distributions
that are made or would have been made to satisfy the decedent's obligations
to support are not considered. 49 Lastly, the statute excludes the value of any
contingent right of the decedent to receive principal when the contingency
was beyond the decedent's control and, in fact, never occurred before the
decedent's death .
The decedent's interest immediately prior to death, in the net cash
surrender value of insurance on the decedent's life is also computed into the
elective estate. 1 The elective share provisions do not apply, though, to any
excess life insurance proceeds52 or proceeds from court ordered insurance
policies on the decedent's life. 3
The elective estate also consists of the value of amounts payable upon
decedent's death under public or private pension, retirement, deferred
compensation or other similar plans, except for those benefits payable under
the Federal Railroad Retirement Act or Federal Social Security System.
54
Also excluded are proceeds in excess of the cash surrender value of life
43. § 732.2035(5)(a)(2).
44. Id.
45. § 732.2035(5)(b).
46. § 732.2035(5)(c).
47. § 732.2035(5)(c)(1).
48. § 732.2035(5)(c)(2).
49. § 732.2035(5)(c)(3). The statute does not limit these distributions to court
ordered support obligations; however, it would seem to create a proof problem otherwise.
50. § 732.2035(5)(c)(4).
51. § 732.2035(6).
52. § 732.2045(1)(d).
53. § 732.2045(1)(e).
54. § 732.2035(7).
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insurance policies related to certain contribution plans defined under the
Internal Revenue Code.
55
The elective estate provisions also apply to property transferred by the
decedent within one year prior to death due to the termination of the
decedent's rights in a revocable trust under section 732.2035(4) or in an
irrevocable trust under section 732.2035(5) that would otherwise have been
included in the elective estate under those sections. 6 Also included is other
property transferred by the decedent within one year prior to death, with
certain exceptions. 7 Payment for medical or educational expenses and
$10,000 payments, which qualify under the Internal Revenue Code gift tax
exclusions, are excepted from the elective estate computation.5
Lastly, the elective estate includes "[piroperty transferred in satisfaction
of the elective share." 59 This transfer is further defined as an "irrevocable
transfer by the decedent to an elective share trust."6 An elective share trust
is defined 6 as one wherein: 1) the surviving spouse is entitled to lifetime
use of the property or to all of the income of the trust payable at least
annually; 62 2) the trust is subject to the Florida "underproductive property"
provision for trust administration 63 or the surviving spouse has the right
under the trust or state law to require the trustee to make the property
productive;64 and 3) the surviving spouse has sole lifetime power to
distribute principal or income to anyone other than the spouse.
65
The property discussed above is subject to additional exclusions under
the elective share provisions.6 6 Property transferred before October 1, 1999,
55. Id.
56. § 732.2035(8)(a). A termination of fights occurs when the decedent ends or
relinquishes such right. § 732.2035(8)(c)(1). Similarly, a terination of a power over
property occurs upon the "exercise, release, lapse, [or] default" of the power or other similar
to termination. Id Termination under this section does not occur pursuant to the terms of the
governing instrument unless such terms were purposefully included to avoid the elective share
provisions. § 732.2035(8)(d)(1).
57. § 732.2035(8)(b).
58. Id.
59. § 732.2035(9).
60. § 732.2025(10).
61. § 732.2025(2). A trust created before October 1, 1999, the effective date of the
new elective share provisions, which meets all the requirements of an "elective share trust" is
treated as one for purposes of the new elective share provisions. § 732.2155(4).
62. § 732.2025(2)(a).
63. § 738.12 (2000).
64. § 732.2025(2)(b).
65. § 732.2025(2)(c).
66. § 732.2045.
2001]
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the effective date of the new elective share provisions, is excluded. 67
Property transferred prior to the decedent's marriage to the surviving spouse
68is likewise excluded. The elective estate also excludes transfers made by
the decedent for adequate consideration 69 or with the surviving spouse's
written consent.70 The decedent's interest in any community property is not
included in the computation of the elective estate.71 Property deemed part of
the decedent's gross estate for federal tax purposes solely because the
decedent held a general power of appointment over that property is also
excluded.72
In addition to the foregoing, property transferred by the decedent into a
"qualifying special needs trust" remains as property separate from the
elective estate. 73 The "qualifying special needs trust" is a court-approved
trust created before or after the decedent's death for the benefit of an
incapacitated spouse and, commencing on the decedent's death,74 the income
and principal are distributable to the surviving spouse for life "in the
discretion of one or more trustees less than half of whom are ineligible
family trustees, 75 and the spouse has sole lifetime power to distribute
income or principal to anyone else.76
In computing the elective estate, most of the property is computed
based on the fair market value on the date of the decedent's death, after
deducting mortgages, claims and liens on that property and claims payable7
from the estate. In the case of the net cash surrender value of life insurance
policies, the computation takes into account the value immediately before
67. § 732.2045(1)(a).
68. Id. This includes property transferred to a revocable or irrevocable trust if the
assets were in trust from at least October 1, 1999, through the date of decedent's death and
were non-marital assets. § 732.2155(6) (2001).
69. § 732.2045(1)(b); see also § 732.2155(5).
70. § 732.2045(1)(c). However, "spousal consent to split-gift treatment under
[federal] gift tax laws does not constitute written consent ... " Id.
71. § 732.2045(1)(f).
72. § 732.2045(1)(h).
73. § 732.2045(1)(g).
74. § 732.2025(8).
75. § 732.2025(8)(a). Ineligible family trustees are the decedent's grandparents and
their descendants who are not also descendants of the surviving spouse. Id.
76. § 732.2025(8)(b).
77. § 732.2055(5). As originally enacted, section 732.2055(5) excluded funeral
expenses as a claim payable by the elective estate for these purposes. § 732.2055. For a
discussion concerning funeral expense inclusion, see Executive Summary, supra note 11, cmt.
at 6.
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the decedent's death. s Any property transferred within one year prior to
decedent's death and includable in the elective estate pursuant to section
732.2035(8) is computed based on the fair market value of the property as of
the date of the termination or transfer of the property, after deducting
mortgages, claims and liens on that property.79 Pension plans and the like
are included based on the tax transfer value of the date of the decedent's
death.80
Once the elective estate is computed, the elective share is satisfied by
property in the following order of priority, unless the decedent's will or a
trust referred to in the will, if any, provides otherwise. 8' First, property
benefiting the surviving spouse is applied to satisfy the elective share.
82
Property benefiting the spouse includes: 1) proceeds from insurance
policies, owned by another person, on the decedent's life to the extent paid
to or benefiting the surviving spouse;8 3 2) amounts paid to or benefiting the
surviving spouse under pension plans and similar arrangements described in
section 732.3025(7); 84 3) the decedent's one-half of community property to
the extent paid to or benefiting the surviving spouse; 85 4) property in a
qualifying special needs trust;86 5) property in the elective estate that passes
to the surviving spouse; 87 and 6) property that would have satisfied the
elective share but for the surviving spouse's disclaimer.88
Then, if that property is insufficient, the balance is satisfied from the
recipients of the remaining property in the elective estate apportioned
according to four classes, in that order of priority.89 Class 1 consists of the
decedent's probate estate, as defined in section 732.2025(7) and revocable
trusts.90 Class 2 includes accounts, securities, and other property held by the
78. § 732.2055(1). However, any right or interest in life insurance policies
transferred within one year prior to the decedent's death and includable in the elective estate
pursuant to section 732.2035(8) is valued as of the date of the termination or transfer of the
right or interest. § 732.2055(2).
79. § 732.2055(4).
80. § 732.2055(3).
81. § 732.2075(1).
82. Id.
83. § 732.2075(1)(a).
84. § 732.2075(1)(b).
85. § 732.2075(1)(c).
86. § 732.2075(1)(d).
87. § 732.2075(I)(e).
88. § 732.2075(1)(O.
89. § 732.2075(2).
90. § 732.2075(2)(a).
2001]
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decedent with another in a survivorship form, such as Totten trusts, joint
tenants with right of survivorship, and tenancy by the entireties. 9 It also
includes the decedent's property interests in irrevocable transfers described
in section 732.2035(5) and pension plans and similar arrangements described
in section 732.2035(7) where the decedent died owning the power to
designate the recipient of those property interests. 92  Class 3 takes into
account all other property interests, except protected charitable interests.
93
Class 4 consists of "protected charitable lead interests," as defined in the
statute, to the extent allowable without disqualifying such interest from
being deducted under the federal gift tax laws.94 As in the computation of
the elective estate, most of the property used to satisfy the elective estate is
valued as of the date of the decedent's death.
95
Only direct recipients of the elective estate and beneficiaries, including
trusts, are liable for contribution to the elective share.9 6 The abatement rules
under section 733.805 continue to apply for distribution of the Class 1
probate estate used to satisfy the elective estate. 97 Recipients of property
designated as Class 2 and Class 3 pay according to their proportionate share
within each class.98 Trust beneficiaries contribute a percentage based on the
amount of principal distributed to such beneficiaries after the decedent's
death.99 Contribution may be in cash or in kind.1° Once payment has been
made to the surviving spouse, as under the old provisions, the spouse is
treated as having predeceased the decedent.1 ' 1
These new provisions have yet to be challenged in court. However,
before they applied to any estates, the legislature found itself tweaking its
91. § 732.2075(2)(b).
92. Id.
93. § 732.2075(2)(c).
94. § 732.2075(2)(d).
95. § 732.2095.
96. § 732.2085(1). Section 732.2115 protects certain payors and third parties acting
in good faith in reliance on a governing instrument. Id. For the definitions of "payor,"
"governing instrument," and certain other terms included in the new elective share provisions,
see generally § 732.2025.
97. § 732.2075(4).
98. § 732.2085(1)(a).
99. § 732.2085(1)(b).
100. § 732.2075(3). See also § 732.2085(2). Section 732.2145 describes the personal
representative's duties in collecting the contribution.
101. § 732.2105(2) (2000). This provision was previously codified in section 732.211.
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own drafted language.10 2 It will be interesting to see how the new provisions
play out.
B. Other Changes to Probate Code
This year, the legislature passed the "Barry Grunow Act," which
provides benefits to public school teachers and administrators who are
intentionally killed or injured in the line of duty.103 As part of the Act, any
paid benefits are included as exempt property under section 732.402.'04 The
Act applies retroactively to incidents occurring on or after May 26, 2000.105
The following changes become effective on January 1, 2002.106 In
order for a spouse residing in Florida to effectively waive rights to the
elective share, intestate share, pretermitted share, homestead, exempt
property, family allowance, and preference in appointment as the personal
representative of an intestate estate, that spouse must sign the waiver in the
presence of two subscribing witnesses. 1°7 Removal of contents from safe
deposit boxes is now governed by section 733.6065.'°z The biggest change
to the previous provision is that, in addition to the safe deposit box
inventory, the personal representative will have to file a copy of the safe
deposit box entry record from the period of time commencing six months
prior to the decedent's death through and including the date of the
inventory. 0 9 A personal representative will now be required to serve formal
notice of a copy of the Notice of Administration on "[plersons who may be
entitled to exempt property."
10
A much needed change was made to the intestacy statute governing
spousal share. When the decedent's lineal descendants are also the surviving
spouse's lineal descendants, the surviving spouse will receive the first
$60,000 of the intestate estate, an increase of $40,000."' Property used to
102. See generally ch. 2001-226.
103. Ch. 2001-180, §§ 1-6, 2001 Fla. Laws 1-3 (codified in FLA. STAT. §§ 112.1915,
732.402). Barry Grunow was a Florida public school teacher shot and killed in the school by
one of his students. Kellie Patrick, Tolerance Dips to Zero as Schools' End Nears, SUN
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), May 31, 2001, at IA.
104. FLA. STAT. § 732.402(2)(d) (2001).
105. § 112.1915.
106. § 731.155.
107. § 732.702(1).
108. § 733.6065.
109. Id.
110. § 733.212(1)(d).
111. § 732.102.
2001]
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effect such a payment will be valued as of the date of distribution, rather
than as of the date of the decedent's death.
112
The maximum amount of family allowance payable to dependents of
the decedent has also been increased to $18,000,113 three times the maximum
previously permitted by law. 114 Exempt property, under section 732.402 of
the Florida Statutes, will now be deducted from the estate before computing
any residuary, intestacy, pretermitted, or elective shares." 5 The suggested
form for the self-proving affidavit includes two separate declarations, one by
the testator/testatrix and another by the witnesses.116  What is most
interesting about this change is that the testator/testatrix will have to declare
to the witnesses that the document is that person's will for the affidavit to be
valid." 7
The anti-lapse statutes will now apply to beneficiaries of testamentary
trusts.1 18  Family administration is completely repealed; 19 however, the
threshold for estates subject to summary administration increases to estates
valued at $75,000120 from $25,000.121 Before the court enters an order
granting summary administration, a petitioner for summary administration
will have to conduct a diligent and reasonable search for ascertainable
creditors, serve a copy of the petition on any such creditors, and provide for
payment to those creditors. 122
The legislature has amended the language of section 732.515 '" to make
it consistent with section 732.505 concerning revocation of a will or codicil
by a subsequent writing. 12 The legislature added a sentence stating that,
where there exists more than one separate writing disposing tangible
112. Id. My students in Wills and Trusts will be elated with this change.
113. § 732.403.
114. Id.
115. § 732.402. I would presume that for these purposes homestead would be treated
in the same manner as exempt property, but this issue has not been addressed by either the
legislature or the courts. Likewise, the statute does not address whether any family allowance
is excluded before determination of those shares.
116. § 732.503.
117. Id.
118. § 732.603.
119. Ch. 2001-226, § 178, 2001 Fla. Laws 108-09.
120. § 735.201(2).
121. See FLA. STAT. § 735.201(2) (2000).
122. § 735.206(2) (2001).
123. § 732.515.
124. Section 732.505 of the Florida Statutes states: "[a] will or codicil, or any part of
either, is revoked... by a subsequent inconsistent will or codicil ... only so far as the
inconsistency."
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personal property, the more recent writing revokes any inconsistent
provisions in any other prior writings.'25 A provision has been added to
section 733.613 of the Florida Statutes, where, upon the issuance of a court
order authorizing the personal representative to sell or mortgage real
property, the purchaser or lender takes the property free of creditors' claims
against the estate, except for existing mortgages and liens, and rights of
estate beneficiaries.
1 26
C. Changes to Trust Administration and Related Statutes
As opposed to the Probate Code, the trust administration statutes have
remained fairly unchanged.'2 7 However, the following are some points of
interest. Effective July 1, 1999, any attorney rendering services to a trust as
of that date may petition for a court order awarding attorneys' fees; the
petition must be served on the trustee and beneficiaries. Also, the
legislature further limited the personal liability of a successor trustee beyond
those succeeding only grantor trustees of revocable trusts.' 29 Under this
provision, a successor trustee is also not personally liable 30 to the trust
beneficiaries for any prior trustee's actions or omissions where a super
majority of the beneficiaries has released the successor trustee T3 or to any
particular beneficiary that has effectuated such a release.
The next legislative session rewrote the trust "slayer statute' ' 132 and
added a provision concerning evidence of death. 33 The language of both
125. § 732.515.
126. § 733.613. The legislature seems to have somewhat codified the result in
Anderson v. Johnson; in that case, the court held that a bona fide buyer who took title to the
estate owned real property, pursuant to a court order, free of an interested party's claim for
partition. 732 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
127. That is not to say that the legislature did not perform some minor housekeeping in
that area as well, such as omitting legalese and changing the word "settlor" to "grantor" in
some provisions. See, e.g., Ch. 2001-226, §§ 187-88, 190,2001 Fla. Laws 113-16, 116-17.
128. FLA. STAT. § 737.2035 (2000). Service on beneficiaries is required only on those
beneficiaries entitled to an accounting. Id.
129. FLA. STAT. § 737.306 (2001). Former section 737.306 of the Florida Statutes
applied only with respect to a trust "that was revocable during the time that the grantor served
as trustee." FLA. STAT. § 737.306 (1999).
130. For a complete list of circumstances under which a successor trustee is not
personally liable, see FLA. STAT. § 737.306 (2001).
131. § 737.306(3)(e)(1). "Super majority" is defined as "at least two-thirds in interest
of the beneficiaries" where the interests are ascertainable or, otherwise, "two-thirds in number
of the beneficiaries." § 737.306(3)(f).
132. § 737.625.
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statutes conforms to the language found in the Probate Code counterparts.1 34
In addition, the legislature extended the savings clause of the rule against
perpetuities from 99 years to 360 years for nonvested property interests and
powers of appointments in trusts created after December 31, 2000.135
D. Other Related Statutory Changes
It has become a bit easier for the estate practitioner regarding estate tax
filings with the Florida Department of Revenue. The Preliminary Notice and
Report has been eliminated for those estates where the decedent died as of
January 1, 2000.136 If no estate tax is due, a practitioner may now simply file
with the clerk of the court an affidavit to this effect.
137
The Medicaid Estate Recovery Act' 38 was enacted effective July 1,
1999.139 This Act establishes the right, pursuant to federal law, of the
Agency for Health Care Administration to file a claim against an estate of a
Medicaid recipient at least fifty-five years old. 40 However, there will be no
recovery by the Agency where the decedent is survived by a spouse, minor
children, or a blind or permanently disabled child.'14  Other heirs may
petition for a hardship waiver under certain circumstances. 142 In addition,
the claim is not enforceable against property exempt from creditors' claims
pursuant to Florida law. 143  In order to ensure compliance, a personal
representative must serve a copy of the Notice of Administration on the
Agency when a decedent was at least fifty-five years old.144
Lastly, the anatomical gifts provisions have been removed from the
Probate Code and added to the chapter on "Health Care Advance
133. § 737.626.
134. See FLA. STAT. §§ 731.103, 732.802 (2000).
135. FLA. STAT. § 689.225(2)(f).
136. Ch. 99-208, § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws 1260, 1265 (repealing FLA. STAT. § 198.12).
137. FLA. STAT. § 198.32(2). For a copy of the "Affidavit of No Estate Tax Due," see
Form DR-312, available at http://sun6.dms.state.fl.usldor/formsl1999/dr312.pdf. If an estate
tax return is in fact filed with the Department of Revenue and yet no estate tax is due, the
Department will still issue a certificate of nonliability. § 198.13(2).
138. § 409.9101.
139. Id.
140. § 409.9101(3).
141. § 409.9101(6).
142. § 409.9101(8).
143. § 409.9101(7).
144. § 733.2121(3)(d).
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Directives."' 45 Chapter 765 had also been amended earlier to, among other
things, permit the termination of life prolonging procedures for persons with
an end-stage condition !4 or in a persistent vegetative state.
1 47
III. PROBATE RULES
There have not been any significant substantive changes to the Florida
Probate Rules. However, one particular rule should please most probate
attorneys. Under rule 5.110, an attorney serving as resident agent for a
personal representative need only state the attorney's office address and
mailing address rather than the attorney's residence address as previously
required.1 48 This amendment became effective January 1, 2001.149
IV. CASES
This Part highlights a few select Florida cases that may be of interest
to a trust and estates practitioner.
The courts had an opportunity to address the distribution of wrongful
death proceeds between the decedent's survivors and estate. In In re Estate
of Wiggins,1 50 the appellate court upheld a lower court's admission of expert
witness testimony concerning the distribution of those proceeds.151 In that
case, an estate recovered, on behalf of the decedent's survivors and estate,
$100,000 in proceeds from the insurer of the driver that killed the
decedent. 152 The hospital where the decedent was taken when the accident
occurred filed a claim against the estate for services rendered in the amount
of $19,030.90. 53 The trial court permitted the personal representative to
introduce the testimony of an attorney specializing in wrongful death
cases.154 Because a jury never heard the case, the attorney, as an expert,
145. §§ 765.510-.522.
146. "End-stage condition" is defined as a severe and permanent irreversible
deterioration. § 765.101(4).
147. § 765.302(1). A "persistent vegetative state" is one where there is permanent and
irreversible unconsciousness. § 765.101(12).
148. Amendments to Florida Probate Rules, 778 So. 2d 272, 280 (Fla. 2001)
(amending, among others, 5 FLA. PROBATE R. 120).
149. Id. at 273.
150. 729 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
151. Id. at526.
152. Id. at 524.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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testified as to the probable jury verdict on damages, and the apportionment
of these damages had the case gone to trial.' 55 The expert estimated that the
jury would probably have awarded $775,000 in damages, 3.3% of which (or
$26,000) would have been distributed to the estate. 56 Since the actual
recovery totaled only $100,000 (the policy's limit), rather than distributing
3.3% of the actual recovery ($3300), the personal representative recom-
mended that the court distribute a greater amount, ten percent of the total
recovery ($10,000), to the estate.157 Due to the order of priority for paying
claims and expenses under the Probate Code, there were barely any funds
remaining to pay the hospital. 5 The hospital appealed the trial court's use
of the expert testimony as to the value of the wrongful death claim and
apportionment of the estimated value. 159 The appellate court held that as
long as the trial court fairly apportions the value of a wrongful death claim
among the decedent's survivors and estate, based on substantial and
competent evidence, then the trial court's ruling stands.
160
Another case also involved the distribution of proceeds recovered in a
settlement before a wrongful death action was instituted. In that case, a
minor child was killed in a car accident caused by her mother. 62 The father,
who was appointed personal representative of the child's estate, asked the
court to award him the full amount of the settlement; the father argued that
the mother was at fault in the accident and thus should be awarded
nothing. 63 The trial court disagreed and apportioned damages among the
two parents based on the intestacy statute. 64 The appellate court reversed.
65
The court applied the Florida Wrongful Death Act in reaching its
decision. 66 The court noted that, in wrongful death claims, a court must
consider the comparative negligence of a survivor in reducing or denying an
apportionment of damages to that survivor. 167 Thus, even though the issue of
apportionment was before the probate court because the claim was settled
155. Wiggins, 729 So. 2d at 524.
156. ld. at 525.
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.707).
159. Id. at 526.
160. Wiggins, 729 So. 2d at 526.
161. Hess v. Hess, 758 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
162. Id. at 1204.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1206.
166. Hess, 758 So. 2d at 1204-05 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27).
167. Id. at 1205 (citing FLA. STAT. § 768.20).
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before suit, theprobate judge could not avoid the application of the wrongful
death statutes.16 Accordingly, the appellate court remanded the case for an
entry of an order awarding all the proceeds to the father.
169
In a case that will surely disturb creditors, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal held that, under the facts, a brother-in-law and a niece related by
marriage were heirs for homestead protection purposes.7 In Moss v.
Moss, 17 a decedent devised a share of her homestead property to the brother
and niece of her predeceased spouse. 172 The lower court afforded homestead
protection to blood relatives of the decedent, but not to her deceased
husband's relatives; therefore, the court awarded the property only to the
decedent's relatives.173 The appellate court noted that in Snyder v. Davis, the
Supreme Court of Florida held that, where a homestead is properly devised,
the homestead provision extends homestead protection to any person
categorized within the intestacy statute.174 Because the intestacy statute
includes familial heirs of the last deceased spouse as heirs of an intestate
estate, the decedent's brother-in-law and niece by marriage were her heirs
for homestead purposes and thus entitled to the devise of the decedent's
homestead property protected from creditors' claims. 175
In In re Estate of DeLuca,176 the Fourth District Court of Appeal
addressed the issue of whether service of a copy of the Notice of
Administration is required when there are later discovered codicils. 177 In
that case, Josephine Hyland, a beneficiary of the decedent's will, received a
copy of the Notice of Administration. 5 Hyland desired to challenge the
validity of the will; however, she did not file a claim within the limitations
period pursuant to section 733.212.179 After the time period for objections
had expired, the co-personal representatives of the estate filed two newly
discovered codicils, which were promptly admitted to probate.' 80 Thepersonal representatives did not send Hyland a Notice of Administration
168. a d at 1205-06.
169. Id at 1206.
170. Moss v. Moss, 777 So. 2d 1110, 1113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
171. Id. at 1110.
172. Id. at 1111.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1112 (citing Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1997)).
175. Moss, 777 So. 2d at 1112-13.
176. 748 So. 2d 1086 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
177. Id at 1086-87.
178. Id. at 1087.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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regarding these codicils. 181 Hyland then filed a petition to revoke the will
and codicil. 
182
The personal representatives argued that her petition was untimely
because the three-month objection period had expired from the time they had
served the Notice of Administration. 183 Hyland's argument was that the
original time period did not apply because a new Notice of Administration
was necessitated with regard to the codicils. 84 The appellate court agreed
with Hyland.1 5 The court first noted that a codicil is included in the
definition of a will.' 86 It then reviewed section 733.212 that limits the time
for an interested person to challenge a will, and thus a codicil, only when a
Notice of Administration has been served. 187 Because no notice as to the
codicils was served on Hyland, she was not time barred and could object to
the validity of the will and codicils under section 733.109.188
In May v. Illinois National Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of Florida
addressed another limitations issue.1 9 In that case, the court reviewed
section 733.702, entitled "Limitations on presentation of claims,"'19 and
section 733.710, entitled "Limitations on claims against estate." 191 The
question certified to the court was:
WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION 733.710 OF
THE FLORIDA STATUTES CONSIDERED SEPARATELY
AND/OR TOGETHER OPERATE AS STATUTES OF
NONCLAIM SO THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION
EXISTS, CLAIMS NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED WITHIN
THE DESIGNATED TIME PERIOD ARE NOT BINDING ON
THE ESTATE, OR DO THEY ACT AS STATUTES OF
LIMITATIONS WHICH MUST BE PLEADED AND PROVED
181. DeLuca, 748 So. 2d at 1088.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. DeLuca, 748 So. 2d at 1088.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1089.
189. May v. Ill. Nat'l Ins. Co., 771 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 2000).
190. Id. at 1145; FLA. STAT. § 733.702 (2000).
191. May, 771 So. 2d at 1145; FLA. STAT. § 733.710.
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AS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES IN ORDER TO AVOID
WAIVER.
192
After analyzing the language in the statutes, the court decided that
section 733.710 is a self-executing statute of repose that absolutely bars any
claims filed on an untimely basis. 193 On the other hand, the court held that
section 733.702 is a statute of limitations. 194 The court based its decision on
the language found in section 733.702. That statute permits an enlargement
of time to file a claim upon a showing of fraud, estoppel or insufficiency of
notice of the claims period.195 However, section 733.702(5) explicitly states
that "nothing in this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in
[section] 733.710.,,196 In reading the two statutes together, the court stated
that holding otherwise would result in both statutes being "all but
indistinguishable."'197 Thus, since there is no provision for extending section
733.710, that statute is a statute of repose which absolutely prohibits
untimely claims.
198
There are four other cases also worthy of mention. In Williams v.
Estate of Pender,199 the First District Court of Appeal held that the elements
of a virtual adoption must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.mo
The court noted that, to date, no other court had affirmatively ruled on the
issue, but it was guided in making its decision by the courts' reasoning in
prior virtual adoption cases.
201
192. May, 771 So. 2d at 1145. The question was certified by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. May v. Ill. Nat'l. Ins. Co., 190 F.3d 1200, 1208 (11th
Cir. 1999). Prior to that, two Florida district courts of appeal had certified a conflict to the
Supreme Court on the same issue. See Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B. v. SDI Operating
Partners, L.P., 673 So. 2d 163, 168 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (certifying conflict with
Baptist Hosp. of Miami v. Carter, 658 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)); Lutheran
Bhd. Legal Reserve Fraternal Benefit Soc'y v. Estate of Petz, 744 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (aligning itself with Comerica and certifying conflict with Baptist
Hospital).
193. May, 771 So. 2d at 1145.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1156.
197. Id.
198. May, 771 So. 2d at 1145.
199. 738 So. 2d 453 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
200. Id. at 456.
201. Id. at 454-56.
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Snyder v. Bell2  concerned the award of attorneys' fees in a claim of
breach of a trustee's fiduciary duties.20 3 At trial, the jury found in favor of
the trustee; however, the court denied the trustee an award of attorneys' fees
under section 737.627.204 On appeal, the court reversed and addressed the
issue of the amount that could be awarded . The court noted that section
737.627 is similar to section 733.106, which provides for the award of
206
attorneys' fees in defending a probate action. The court then relied on the
opinion in Dayton v. Conger where the Third District Court of Appeal held
that there is no personal liability for attorneys' fees under section 733.106.20
Accordingly, the court held that the trustee's award of attorney's fees could
be no greater than the beneficiary's share in the trust.
208
In the third case, also concerning attorneys' fees, the Third District
Court of Appeal issued a warning regarding duplication of such fees. 2 9 The
Brake court stated, in dicta, that needless legal work should not be
210rewarded. In a strongly worded opinion, it stated that the public has
become repulsed by a probate process which "they perceive to be a sharing
of the estate with an attorney. It suggested that courts "seize control" as
they are the "ultimate guardian[s] of the public's ... property.
21 2
Finally, in Persan v. Life Concepts, Inc.,213 the court stated that
"[m]aking a gift to a charity for a specific project or purpose does not create,,214
a charitable trust. There, some donors had given twenty-four acres of
real property to Central Florida Sheltered Workshop, Inc. ("CFSW") to
215construct homes for disadvantaged adults. CFSW built the homes but sold
216the property fifteen years later.
202. 746 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
203. Id. at 1100.
204. Id. at 1101. Section 737.627 provides for the award of attorneys' fees in
challenges to trustees' exercise of powers. FLA. STAT. § 737.627 (2000).
205. Snyder, 746 So. 2d at 1103-04.
206. Id. at 1104 (citing FLA. STAT. § 733.106).
207. Id. at 1104 (citing Dayton v. Conger, 448 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984)).
208. Id.
209. Brake v. Murphy, 736 So. 2d 745, 748 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
210. rd.
211. Id. at749.
212. Id.
213. 738 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
214. Id. at 1010.
215. Id. at 1009.
216. Id.
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A lawsuit was filed against Life Concepts, Inc., the successor charity to
CFSW, for breach of a charitable trust or, in the alternative, an imposition of
a resulting trust.217 The court held that neither type of trust existed.21s In
order to create a charitable trust in land, the trust must be in writing, signed
by the party creating the trust and evincing the intent to create a trust.219 In
this case, the real property was given by deed with no restrictions, right of
reverter or other conditions creating an express charitable trust. 22  Again,
because the court found that the property was transferred directly by the
owner to CFSW as a gift, the court found that a resulting trust did not
exist.
221
V. CONCLUSION
It is evident from this survey that the law of trusts and estates is not
well settled in this state. In some instances, the Florida Legislature was
motivated by a need to implement clarifications to the language in the law.
Other changes reflect the need to fulfill the legislature's role in responding
to public policy needs. Similarly, the courts' decisions in recent cases
attempt to meet these goals. Clearly, it is imperative that the practitioner in
this dynamic field closely monitor changes in the law of trusts and estates.
217. Id at 1009-10.
218. Persan, 738 So. 2d. at 1012.
219. Id. at 1012 (citing FLA. STAT. § 689.05).
220. Id. at 1011.
221. Id. at 1012.
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